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дини, у тому числі прав дитини. Тобто, вперше офіційно робиться 
спроба побудувати таку ієрархію цінностей, яка б дозволила ЄС 
наближатись до глобальних цілей, які закріплені у першому пара-
графі ст. 3 Договору про Європейський Союз: підтримувати мир, 
свої гiдності та добробут своїх народів.
Поважати і дотримуватися цих цінностей – обов’язок як Со-
юзу в цілому, так і кожної входящої до нього держави окремо. Від-
даність цінностям ЄС також виступає як непорушна умова, що 
пред’являється до держав, що бажають вступити до складу Євро-
пейського Союзу. Неповага до цих цінностей може спричинити за-
стосування до держави-порушника санкції у вигляді призупинення 
певних прав, пов’язаних з членством в ЄС. Так згідно зi ст. 7 Дого-
вору про ЄС, у випадку існування явної погрози серйозного пору-
шення якою-небудь державою-членом цінностей, зазначених у ст. 2, 
Рада, після констатації зазначеної погрози, може направити державі-
порушникові рекомендації із запобігання причин, що викликали по-
дібну констатацію. А у випадку серйозного та стійкого порушення 
якою-небудь державою-членом цінностей, зазначених у ст. 2, Рада 
може ухвалити рішення щодо призупинення окремих прав, що ви-
пливають із застосування Договорів до відповідної держави-члена, 
у тому числі права голосу представника уряду цiєї держави.
Європейський Союз не зупиняється на досягнутому і постій-
но вдосконалює наданий своїм громадянам простір свободи, без-
пеки та правосуддя. Перенесення загальнолюдських, глобальних 
цінностей у наднаціональну правову систему ЄС можна розгля-
дати як формування регіональних цінностей, притаманних саме 
європейськiй цивілізації. Будучи легітимізованими у формі закону, 
вони сприяють утворенню прямих і зворотних зв’язків, що забез-
печують ефективність управління принципово новим державопо-
дібним утворенням на наднаціональному рівні.
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DIFFICULTIES OF UKRAINE’S CHOICE BETWEEN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CUSTOmS UNION
Choosing between European and Customs Union is one of the 
major issues facing Ukraine today. Earlier the authorities had fully 
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adjusted to the West and claimed that European integration is the priority 
of its foreign policy, but now they are searching for ways of integration 
to such associations as Customs and the Eurasian Union. According to 
experts, in the near future Ukraine has to decide the direction of foreign 
policy.
After serious decline in the 1990s, Ukraine’s economy finally 
started its recovery and systemic reform in early 2000. While 
the economy rapidly grew by 2008, its transformation remained 
unfinished. The agenda of the current government under President 
Viktor Yanukovych is being driven by the interests of a small group of 
people. This, together with the electoral cycle, makes the administration 
disinclined to implement painful and long-awaited structural reforms. 
The economic crisis of 2008-2009 put Ukraine’s only semi-transformed 
economic model in question. The closed nature of Ukraine’s economy 
and high dependence on low value-added exports are an unsustainable 
basis for economic growth. To return to double-digit gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth and put the economy on a path of sustainable 
development, the country has to seek external resources and become 
more open. However, Ukraine’s bad international ranking, lack of 
substantial natural resources and rent-seeking economy does not make 
it an attractive foreign direct investment (FDI) destination.
Ukraine is now at a crossroads. There are three possible roads to 
take. The first, and least probable, is to stay on its own and continue 
«business as usual,» i. e. to retain a relatively closed economy controlled 
by a small group of businessmen, with little competition and limited 
economic freedom. The second, and currently most feasible, is to sign 
an Association Agreement (AA) with the EU that includes a Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). Negotiations with the 
EU are now finalized: the agreement was finally initialed at the end 
of March 2012–not without much controversy. However, further steps, 
such as signing and ratification of the agreement depend solely on the 
Ukrainian side. The third, and most controversial, choice is to join the 
Customs Union with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and embark on 
further Moscow-led integration projects. Ukraine’s choice will not only 
affect trade flows with its two neighbors. It will also indicate the speed 
and direction of structural reforms, or lack thereof. Ukraine’s choice 
will also have an impact on the EU and Russia. Ukraine is a key country 
within the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative (EaP). It is first of all 
the largest country in the EaP region with a population of forty-six 
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million. It is also the country that initially had the biggest number of 
supporters among the EU member states. Ukraine was the first country 
to be offered deep economic integration and political association with 
the EU. Within the Partnership, the EU invested considerable political 
capital on Ukraine and the EU-Ukraine AA/DCFTA will serve as a model 
for relations with other EaP countries. For Russia, striving to rebuild 
a closely linked economic area within the post-Soviet space, Ukraine 
plays a key role. Without Ukraine, the post-Soviet space’s second 
largest economy, the Customs Union and further integration projects 
may be unsustainable in the long term. Over the past months, Ukraine’s 
leadership has repeatedly confirmed the country’s interest in signing and 
ratifying the Association Agreement with the EU. Meanwhile, Russia’s 
invitation to join the Customs Union has been consistently, but politely 
declined. However, many Western and Russian observers still question 
the irreversibility and credibility of this decision. The membership in 
the Customs Union may bring cheap Russian gas that official Kyiv is 
in dire need of. Ukrainian officials also keep making references to the 
Customs Union both in public debates and private conversations with 
the EU officials.
The decision of which path to take has yet to be taken, however. 
When the time comes, it will be made by president Yanukovych alone. 
Unfortunately for Ukraine, it will not be made based on expertise and 
calculations of the national interest; rather, it will be informed by factors 
the interests of the president and his entourage.
While the costs and benefits of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA have 
been calculated and are publicly discussed, similar estimates are 
lacking concerning the Customs Union. Deeper integration with the 
EU will cost Ukraine–both the state and businesses–in the short run. 
However, it promises to have clear welfare benefits in five to ten years. 
It may also send a positive signal to foreign investors and create new 
possibilities for Ukrainian goods and services on EU markets through 
the improvement of norms and standards. The Ukrainian economy is 
supposed to become more transparent and the rules of the game for 
businesses are likely to improve significantly. There is little evidence to 
suggest that membership in the Customs Union would bring sustainable 
benefits. The Russian government has presented several positive figures, 
but no substantial evidence. The experience of Belarus and Kazakhstan 
shows their bargaining power in relation to Russia to be limited. The 
costs of deviation from WTO commitments are likely to outweigh 
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compensation promised by Russia. Moreover, the Ukrainian leadership 
and the business interests connected to it are not ready to hand decision-
making power to Moscow.
Russia’s offer is based on promises. Yet there is little evidence 
of available money in Moscow. Promises of cheaper gas are likely 
to remain on paper. Moreover, Ukraine’s economy may be better off 
without cheaper gas. Georgia’s experience shows that once cut from the 
«Russian energy needle,» it becomes easier to diversify energy sources 
and increase energy efficiency. However, Russian threats of negative 
consequences are real and Ukrainian businesses are concerned about 
them.
The consensus in Ukraine’s public and elite debate is largely in 
favor of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA while membership in the Customs 
Union does not find public support. Thus, it is difficult to see Ukraine 
changing course especially given forthcoming parliamentary elections 
in October 2012 and presidential elections in 2015.
Kyiv’s choice will be made based on the economic (corporate) 
interests of the current leadership and a small circle of businesses 
around it rather than on expert calculations. So far analysis suggests that 
the leadership is in favor of a European direction. Even if democratic 
failings prevent Ukraine from signing the EU-Ukraine DCFTA in the 
short run, it is highly unlikely that Kyiv would consider Customs Union 
membership.
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ЕВРОПЕйскиЕ ТРАДиции фОРМиРОВАниЯ 
ЮРиДичЕскОй элиТы
С активностью элит во многом связаны перспективы соци-
ального прогресса. Адекватное освещение вопросов формирова-
ния и функционирования юридической элиты позволяет яснее ви-
деть перспективы развития ведущих государств Европы.
В юридической науке проблема юридической элиты напря-
мую связывается с юридическим образованием. Европейские 
государства обладают богатым арсеналом традиций и огромным 
опытом в подготовке квалифицированных юристов. Этот опыт 
